Pricing for Scarcity by Roseta-Palma, Catarina & Monteiro, Henrique
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Pricing for Scarcity
Catarina Roseta-Palma and Henrique Monteiro
Dinaˆmia - ISCTE
June 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10384/
MPRA Paper No. 10384, posted 10. September 2008 06:18 UTC
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pricing for Scarcity 
 
 
Catarina Roseta Palma 
Henrique Monteiro 
 
 
 
Junho de 2008 
WP nº 2008/65 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTO DE TRABALHO 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D I N Â M I A  C E N T R O  D E  E S T U D O S  S O B R E  A  M U D A N Ç A S O C I O E C O N Ó M I C A 
 
 
 
 
Catarina Roseta Palma 
Henrique Monteiro 
 
WP nº 2008/65 
Junho de 2008 
 
Abstract  
1. INTRODUCTION 2 
2. EXISTING WATER TARIFFS 4 
3. EFFICIENT WATER PRICING LITERATURE 6 
4. SCARCITY IN A SIMPLE MODEL 9 
5. SCARCITY WITH A DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER TYPES 12 
6. SCARCITY IN DEMAND, COST, AND AVAILABILITY 14 
7. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SCARCITY                                                       19 
8. CONCLUSION 21 
9. APPENDIX A 23 
10. APPENDIX B 24 
REFERENCES 25 
Pricing for Scarcity
Catarina Roseta-Palma∗ Henrique Monteiro†
Abstract
In many areas where water is not abundant, water pricing sched-
ules contain significant nonlinearities. Existing pricing literature estab-
lishes that eﬃcient schedules will depend on demand and supply char-
acteristics. However, most empirical studies show that actual pricing
schemes have little to do with theoretical eﬃciency results. In par-
ticular, there are very few models recommending increasing blocks,
whereas we present evidence that this type of tariﬀ structure is abun-
dantly used. Water managers often defend increasing blocks, both as
a means to benefit smaller users and as a way to signal scarcity.
Naturally, in the presence of water scarcity the true cost of water
increases due to the emergence of a scarcity cost. In this paper, we
incorporate the scarcity cost associated with insuﬃcient water avail-
ability into the optimal tariﬀ design in several diﬀerent models. We
show that when both demand and costs respond to climate factors,
increasing marginal prices may come about as a combined result of
scarcity and customer heterogeneity under specific conditions.
We also investigate the eﬀect that rising water scarcity in the long
run can have on the steady-state amount of capital invested in water
storage and supply infrastructures and obtain some results that are
consistent with the static models.
JEL classification: D42; Q25
Keywords: water pricing; nonlinear pricing; increasing block tariﬀs; wa-
ter scarcity.
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1 Introduction1
In many areas where water is not abundant, water pricing schedules contain
significant nonlinearities. When adequate distribution networks exist, utili-
ties tend to be local natural monopolies, consumers cannot choose multiple
connections and resale is tricky. Thus it is easy, and often politically expedi-
ent, for utilities to undertake extensive price discrimination, both for distinct
types of consumers (residential, industrial, agricultural, and so on) and for
diﬀerent levels of consumption within each consumer type. Many utilities
use two-part tariﬀs, with fixed meter charges and a constant unit price, or
multipart tariﬀs, which combine fixed charges and increasing or, less often,
decreasing blocks. Occasionally, seasonal price variations are employed to
reflect changes in water availability throughout the year. Less common is
the imposition of a scarcity surcharge during drought periods, regardless of
the season. In extreme droughts water rationing is generally preferred.
This paper presents some relevant characteristics of existing water tar-
iﬀs (Section 2), focusing on Portuguese tariﬀs for the residential sector. As
expected, tariﬀs are usually composed by both a meter charge and a volu-
metric price, but the latter almost always consists of increasing block tariﬀs
(IBT). More surprisingly, considering the well-known significant seasonal dif-
ferences in water availability in the country, seasonal surcharges or seasonal
price variations are not common in Portuguese water tariﬀs. Moreover, the
few that do exist seem to be uncorrelated with regional characteristics in
terms of seasonal water scarcity. It should also be emphasized that many
utilities incorporate a number of further complications in their water rate
calculations, enabling us to say that complexity is definitely the prevailing
feature of water tariﬀs in Portugal. For other countries, the trend towards
increasing blocks is also present, as noted in several publications.
It seems that the reasons why most water managers continue to defend
increasing blocks are their ability to benefit smaller users and their potential
role in signalling scarcity. Although, in the presence of water scarcity, the
true cost of water increases due to the emergence of a scarcity cost, it is
unclear whether increasing block tariﬀs are the best way to make consumers
1This paper was created within the research project POCI 2010/EGE/61306/2004—
Tarifaqua, supported by the FCT - POCI 2010, co-financed by the European fund ERDF.
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understand and respond to water scarcity situations, especially when the
resulting tariﬀs are very complex.
In contrast, most results found in the literature on eﬃcient tariﬀ design
do not generally recommend increasing price schedules. Only part of the
abundant literature on water pricing provides eﬃciency results, since most
studies either compare the properties of diﬀerent possible price schemes,
estimate water demand, or point out the diﬃculties in implementing more
eﬃcient pricing rules. Section 3 summarizes the main eﬃciency results,
indicating justifications for increasing block rates whenever they appear,
and noting that none of them is directly related to scarcity.
Current analysis of this issue is specially relevant considering that the
Water Framework Directive requires that by 2010 (art.9, n.1) pricing poli-
cies in the European Union’s member states not only recover the costs of
the resource (including enviromental and scarcity costs) but also provide
adequate incentives for consumers to use water eﬃciently, contributing to
the attainment of environmental quality targets. In particular, the prob-
lem of water scarcity is now recognized by the European Commission as an
increasingly relevant one in the face of the increased frequency of extreme
climate events that may occur because of climate change, as can be seen in
a recent Communication that was issued on the topic (EC (2007)).
This paper proposes diﬀerent models of eﬃcient and second-best nonlin-
ear prices under scarcity constraints, and concludes that, when both demand
and costs respond to climate factors, increasing marginal prices may come
about as a combined result of scarcity and customer heterogeneity under
specific conditions, even if nonlinear pricing is a consequence of customer
heterogeneity and not of water scarcity. Finally, we use a dynamic model
to analyze the simultaneous decision on pricing and investment by a public
utility and to investigate the eﬀect that rising water scarcity, brought about
for instance by global warming, can have on the steady-state amount of cap-
ital invested in water storage and supply infrastructures, and conclude that
some results are similar to the ones from the previous static models.
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2 Existing water tariﬀs
In 2005, the Portuguese National Water Institute (INAG) released results
for the National Survey on Water and Wastewaster Systems for 2002 (re-
cently updated for 2005). While previous surveys had focused only on the
water and sewage infrastructures, this one began a systematic gathering of
economic information. The INSAAR database contains economic data on
the management model followed by water utilities, on investments for the
period 1987-2005, and on costs, revenues, prices and quantities of water de-
livered (to customers or to other water utilities) for the years 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2005. This section provides a brief description of economic data
for the year 2005, focusing on the domestic water supply component2.
The data indicates that 97.5% of water supply tariﬀs in Portugal are
composed of a fixed charge and a volumetric rate. The fixed charge is de-
pendent on the diameter of the pipe. All the 278 water utilities responsible
for public water supply at the municipal level and which provided informa-
tion on tariﬀs have volumetric rates in their tariﬀs. Moreover, all but three
of the them apply IBT (a few self-supplying organizations and tourist resorts
also practice flat rate volumetric prices). The average number of blocks is
5, but it can be as high as 30 in some extreme cases. The majority of utili-
ties using block tariﬀs charges the volume within each block. Nevertheless,
16.5% of them use a diﬀerent way to calculate the final tariﬀ, by charging
all volume at the price of the last block reached by metered consumption
in the period3. This causes the marginal price faced by the consumer to
have significant peaks at the block limits. In this pricing system, the first
cubic meter within a block can cost a consumer several times the price of
the previous and the next unit, something that will hardly be clear to the
average consumer from the information in the water bill.
The popularity of increasing block tariﬀs is not a Portuguese peculiar-
ity. Hoﬀmann, Worthington and Higgs (2006) mentions “the trend in most
OECD economies towards metering, increasing block prices and reduced
2Because the INSAAR database suﬀers from a strong presence of missing values, addi-
tional data has been requested by the authors directly to the water utilities to fill in the
information gaps. The statistics reported in this paper already reflect such data collection
and improvement.
3An additional 1.4% combine both calculation procedures in the tariﬀ schedule applying
one or the other according to the block of consumption reached.
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subsidies for residential water supply”, as reported by Dalhuisen, Groot and
Nijkamp (2001) to the European Commission in 2001. The OECD itself not
only reports the growing use of IBT by stating that “there is evidence that
the use of such tariﬀs [IBT] is increasing” (OECD (2003a)), but also seems
to support their use by saying that “there seem to be clear potential ben-
efits from increasing block tariﬀ structure” (OECD (2003a)). Bartoszczuk
and Nakamori (2004) point out that “the strong tradition of low tariﬀs for
households and increasing block rates is present in Belgium, Italy, Greece,
Portugal, Spain and US”. With the Belgian exception, we find very similar
climate conditions in these countries (or parts of them, given the size of the
US). The use of IBT in these and other countries is also well documented
in several OECD reports (OECD (2006), OECD (2003a), OECD (2003b) ,
OECD (1999a), OECD (1999b) or OECD (1999c)). One of the advantages
of IBT, pointed out by several authors and also in the OECD reports, is
related with aﬀordability for poorer households. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that in Portugal water expenses fall below 1% of average disposable
income (Roseta-Palma, Monteiro, Meireles, Mestre and Sugahara (2006)).
Furthermore, the aﬀordability argument cannot explain the use of a large
number of blocks.
One feature we would expect to see in Portuguese water tariﬀs given
the variable weather conditions, which include significant seasonal weather
diﬀerences, namely in rainfall, and the existence of drought-prone regions,
is seasonal surcharges. However, no more than 3% of water utilities use
such tools in their water tariﬀs. Moreover, their location seems unrelated
to the water availability problems in the country, with most of them being
located in the wetter regions of the coastal northwest of the country. The
few seasonal surcharges we do find are in place during the summer months
and typically raise the price of the higher blocks between 30%-50%.
It is clear that simplicity is not a prevalent feature of Portuguese water
tariﬀs. The calculation process of the IBT (volume charged within each
block or at the price of the last block) can be mixed in some utilities, de-
pending on the consumption block. Tariﬀs can combine blocks with flat
(nonvolumetric) fees within some blocks with volumetric rates for others.
Specific formulas are sometimes applied within the blocks to find the unit
price. Water availability charges that are fixed within each block, but vari-
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able among blocks, are sometimes levied and added to the price. Some
utilities practice social tariﬀs for disadvantaged households or, apart from
the usual tariﬀ diﬀerentiation by customer class, propose special contracts
with diﬀerent prices to various types of specific consumers (from farmers,
factories or services to schools, sporting clubs or nonprofit organizations,
to name a few). Furthermore, additional complications can be found in
wastewater price schedules.
Finally, it should be noted that the 87% value for the national cost re-
covery level for water supply falls below 100% (considering only financial
costs), and the situation is even worse for wastewater drainage and treat-
ment services with a value of 57% (INAG/MAOTDR (2007)). This can be
explained by the fact that some utilities do not charge for wastewater at all,
while others make the payment dependent of variables such as apartment
area; number of inhabitants/beds/rooms, real estate value of the house or
building or taxable income. The majority of wastewater utilities levy at
least some of their charges based on water consumption levels, so that both
payments are part of the water bill.
A more detailed analysis of the costs and revenues of the Portuguese
water supply and wastewater industry can be found in Monteiro (2007).
Monteiro and Roseta-Palma (2007) present an in-depth description of the
existing tariﬀ structures, including all customer classes.
3 Eﬃcient water pricing literature
In this section, we review the literature on water pricing, focusing on the
results dealing with nonlinear pricing, scarcity and seasonal rates4. Several
important issues are not specific to the water sector: marginal cost pricing,
capacity constraints, resource scarcity, revenue requirements or nonlinear
pricing are significant in the more general framework of regulated public
utilities, as is clear from books like Brown and Sibley (1986) and Wilson
(1993). However, such issues appear in this sector combined with some of
its peculiarities, such as the large capital investments which turn suppli-
ers into local natural monopolies, the seasonal and stochastic variability of
the resource it aims to supply and the essential value of the good for its
4A more detailed survey can be found in Monteiro (2005).
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consumers.
The first question to be addressed in the water pricing literature was the
incompatibility between the marginal pricing recommendation from micro-
economics and the average cost pricing practice in the water industry. Al-
though cost recovery is an important goal, so that average costs are clearly
paramount in the utilities’ actual rate setting, the idea, stressed many times
by economists, is that more attention needs to be paid to marginal costs.
A water user will decide whether or not to consume an additional unit by
comparing the benefit associated to that unit with its price (which may or
may not be the same as average price, depending on the rate structure).
Therefore, in the absence of external eﬀects, social net benefits should be
maximized when the price per unit is equal to the marginal cost of supply-
ing the water. This literature dates back to the 60’s (Hirshleifer, de Haven
and Milliman (1960)), but despite the overwhelming evidence in favour of
marginal cost pricing as a more eﬃcient pricing tool, the discussion has not
fully subsided. Briand (2006), for example, uses a dynamic computable gen-
eral equilibrium model to question the application of average cost pricing
in Senegal. Moreover, there are more eﬃcient ways of achieving a balanced
budget than average cost pricing. For example, two-part tariﬀs can separate
the recovery of fixed and variable costs through fixed charges and volumetric
rates on water consumption. Second-best Ramsey pricing can, as shown in
the following sections, diﬀerentiate price according to the customers’ price-
elasticities of demand, charging higher tariﬀs to customer types that respond
less to price changes. This technique allows the utility to recover costs while
sacrificing as little welfare as possible.
Since marginal cost pricing does not ensure that the water utility will
break even, as average-cost pricing does, the harmonisation of eﬃciency
with the balancing of the utility’s budget has been the subject of much
attention. Collinge (1992), Kim (1995), Griﬃn (2001) and Schuck and Green
(2002) have all dealt with this question. While Collinge (1992) works out a
way to return excess profit to consumers through tradable discount coupons
(arguing his method does not require the utility to gather information on
water demand), Kim (1995) relies on Ramsey second-best pricing to ensure
that a two product utility producing residential and non-residential water
collects enough revenue to meet its costs. Schuck and Green (2002) also
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base their analysis on a Ramsey pricing rule, while Griﬃn (2001) proposes a
threshold on water consumption to be added to a two-part tariﬀ, generating
credits to the consumer below the threshold (as in Collinge (1992), the aim
is to return excess profits).
The importance of price diﬀerentiation, according to the type of customer
or the season of the year, is another question that is covered in the literature.
Temporal price variation in particular has been analysed by several authors,
who have pointed out the advantages of having intra-annual price changes to
reflect diﬀerences in marginal costs, with the aim of enhancing eﬃciency (an
early example is Gysi and Loucks (1971)). A more recent paper is Schuck
and Green (2002), which presents a supply-based water pricing model (where
price changes with water availability). It uses a conjunctive use system for
farming with stochastic surface water flows and combines it with second-best
(Ramsey) water pricing. It considers the possibility of recharging the aquifer
with excessive surface water in bountiful years, although not without a cost.
The authors use simulation techniques to test their model on a Californian
water district using land, water and energy, and conclude that a supply-
based pricing policy reduces the use of these three resources in periods of
drought.
The analysis of capacity constraints on water supply and the related is-
sued of optimal timing for system expansion is another subject that dates
back to the 60’s and 70’s, when the problem of supplying enough water to
meet the needs was mostly seen as a problem of increasing capacity (Ri-
ordan (1971), Riley and Scherer (1979), or Manning and Gallagher (1982),
are examples of authors dealing with these issues). The problem of water
storage is related to the problem of resource variability, resulting either from
expected seasonal rainfall variability or from the more uncertain occurrence
of longer periods of drought, which can alternate with plentiful rain or even
floods.
The scarcity of the resource itself is a more recent concern in the litera-
ture. It has accompanied a change in water managers’ concerns, from water
supply increase to water demand management. Moncur and Pollock (1988)
deal with the problem of determining the scarcity rent of water. They con-
sider the case of a water utility with groundwater as its only source, and use
a nonrenewable resource eﬃcient extraction model to determine the scarcity
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value and the eﬃcient path of price in the future. They calculate the scarcity
value through the consideration of the future increase in costs originated by
the necessity to use costly backstop technologies (such as desalination or
trans-basin diversions) to satisfy water demand. They apply their model to
Honolulu and find the scarcity value to be approximately twice the current
water charge. Elnaboulsi (2001) includes a constraint on the water available
which, when binding, allows the determination of the shadow value of wa-
ter resources to be included in the price. Griﬃn (2001) demonstrates that
the price should include opportunity costs such as the marginal user cost of
water (for renewable or non-renewable sources) and the marginal capacity
cost. This issue will be developed in the following sections.
Finally, in relation to nonlinear prices, while we can find examples of
authors who support the use of increasing block tariﬀs for water (Gysi and
Loucks (1971) is, again, an early example), such support is based on distri-
butional considerations and not on eﬃciency. Cardadeiro (2005) is a partial
exception. He introduces a social benefit of universal access, through the
consideration of a positive externality for the first few liters/person/day,
due to public health improvements. The existence of only two blocks in
the tariﬀ is imposed on the model, as it is argued that such an externality
makes sense only for those first few liters. The result, as expected, is that
social welfare can be maximized by setting the first block price lower than
the second. In another of the rare water pricing models applying nonlinear
pricing, Elnaboulsi (2001) develops a model of optimal nonlinear pricing of
water and wastewater services, considering the issues of temporal variation,
capacity constraints, scarcity and consumer heterogeneity. He concludes
that the marginal price should be constant or decreasing, in which case a
menu of two-part tariﬀs can be constructed in such a way that it would be
equivalent to oﬀering consumers quantity discounts.
4 Scarcity in a simple model
A simple view of the main aspects of eﬃciency in water prices is presented
by Griﬃn (2001) and Griﬃn (2006). His model includes three pricing com-
ponents: the volumetric (ie. per unit) price, the constant meter charge and
the one-oﬀ connection charge. The latter is meant to reflect network ex-
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pansion costs and will not be considered in our model.5 We focus on the
volumetric part of the tariﬀ, not taking into account the two-part tariﬀ case.
On the other hand, he assumes a single volumetric price and does not al-
low for more general nonlinear prices, as neither consumer heterogeneity nor
purchase size cost dependency are taken into account. In fact, Griﬃn (2001)
stresses ”the ineﬃciencies of block rate water pricing” (pp. 1339 and 1342).
A static model for diﬀerent (identified) consumer groups, with a scarcity
constraint, shows that the marginal cost pricing rule still holds. Define
Bj(wj) as the increasing and concave monetized benefit of water consump-
tion for consumer group j, with j = 1, ..., J and C(w) as the (convex) water
supply costs6, which depend on the total water supplied, ie. w =
PJ
j=1wj .
Water availability is limited, with the maximum amount denoted asW. The
welfare maximization problem is
Max
{wj}
JP
j=1
Bj(wj)− C(w)
s.t.
JP
j=1
wj ≤W
(1)
resulting in first order conditions7
dBj
dwj
=
dC
dw
+ μ ∀j (2)
JP
j=1
wj ≤ W, μ ≥ 0, μ(W −
JP
j=1
wj) = 0 (3)
where μ is the Lagrangean multiplier and it is assumed that all wj are pos-
itive (every consumer requires a minimum amount of water). The eﬃciency
result, expressed in equation (2), indicates that the marginal benefit of water
consumption should be equal to marginal costs (including scarcity costs if
the constraint is binding). Also, the marginal benefit needs to be the same
across consumers, since marginal cost is the same. Finally, with a unit price
5Access to water supply networks is nearly universal in Portugal by now, with 92,3%
nationwide connection rates and 100% in urban areas IA/MAOTDR (2006).
6We do not explicitly consider fixed costs for simplicity, because they do not change
the conclusions.
7There are no cross eﬀects in demand, ie. dBjdwi = 0 for i 6= j.
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pj the benefit maximization problem for each consumer is
Max
wj
Bj(wj)− pjwj (4)
⇔ dBj
dwj
= pj (5)
so that the eﬃcient unit price must be the same for all consumers and is
given by
p =
dC
dw
+ μ (6)
as in Griﬃn (2006).8 The lower the W the tighter the constraint, meaning
that price should rise to reflect increasing scarcity. However, this rule does
not ensure that the water utility’s budget is balanced, namely if there are
fixed costs or if marginal cost is not constant. Although a fixed meter com-
ponent could be adjusted to reflect such concerns, the second-best pricing
rule is obtained by imposing a break-even constraint such as (7) on problem
(1). This is known as Ramsey pricing. Note that pj(wj) is now the inverted
demand of consumer j.
JP
j=1
pj(wj)wj − C(w) = 0 (7)
Using equation (5), the welfare maximizing prices will now be given by
pj −
³
dC
dw +
μ
1+λ
´
pj
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ξj
³
w∗j
´ (8)
where ξj is the absolute value of the price elasticity of j’s demand and λ
is the Lagrange multiplier of (7). This is a version of the so-called Inverse
Elasticity Rule, which states that the mark-up of prices over marginal cost
will be inversely related to the demand elasticity, so that consumers with
lower demand elasticities will pay higher prices and vice-versa. The only
new term is μ1+λ , which reflects the scarcity cost. It adds to the price faced
by the consumer the opportunity cost of using a scarce resource, but it does
not aﬀect the shape of the price schedule. Nonlinear prices may arise in
this model because of heterogeneity in the consumers’ preferences (diﬀer-
ent price-elasticities), not because of scarcity. Nonlinear prices would be
8The same result can be obtained with the more complicated pricing formula from
Griﬃn (2001). In that case the bill paid by each consumer is given by Billj =M+p(wj−
w), where M is the meter charge and w is a budget-balancing parameter.
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increasing if the price-elasticities decrease with higher optimal consumption
choices and decreasing otherwise. It should be noted that if the scarcity cost
is defined as a tax which the supplier collects but does not keep, along the
lines of what is already done in some European countries, the model will
have to be changed accordingly. This is particularly important when several
suppliers share available water, since none of them will adequately provide
for external scarcity costs.
5 Scarcity with a distribution of consumer types
In this section a more complete model is presented, explicitly characteriz-
ing demand behavior through the definition of a continuum of consumer
types. Model development is based on Brown and Sibley (1986) as well as
Elnaboulsi (2001). A new parameter, θ, is introduced to reflect diﬀerences
in consumer tastes, which can encompass a number of variables, including
income, family size, or housing. A consumer with tastes given by θ will now
enjoy net benefits of B(w, θ) − P (w), where P (w) is the total payment for
water consumption. It is assumed that B(0, θ) = 0 and that high values of
θ imply higher consumption benefits (∂B∂θ > 0,
∂2B
∂θ∂w > 0). The distribution
of θ throughout the consumer population is described by a distribution fun-
tion G(θ) and the associated density function g(θ). Maximum and minimum
values for the taste parameter are represented by θ and θ, respectively, so
that G(θ) = 1 and G(θ) = 0.
The first order condition of each consumer’s net benefit maximization is
∂B(w, θ)
∂w
=
dP
dw
≡ pm (9)
which is similar to condition (5) except the right-hand side represents the
slope of the total payment function, i.e. the marginal price pm. The only
restriction to the shape of P (w) is that, if concave, it must be less so than
the benefit function to ensure that the decision is indeed a maximizing one.
Using the consumer’s choice, w(θ), the value function is
V (θ) = B(w(θ), θ)− P (w(θ)) (10)
To find the properties of the optimal payment function with a scarcity re-
striction, or rather the second best function given the break-even constraint,
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the following problem can be solved
Max
w(θ)
θR
θ
V (θ)g(θ)dθ +
θR
θ
[P (w(θ))− C(w(θ))] g(θ)dθ
s.t.
θR
θ
[P (w(θ))−C(w(θ))] g(θ)dθ = 0
θR
θ
w(θ)g(θ)dθ ≤W
(11)
where the first component of the objective function represents consumer
surplus aggregating all consumer types, and the second component is profit.
Some manipulations yield a more tractable version of the problem. Substi-
tuing P (w (θ)) using equation (10), noting that G(θ) − 1 =
R
g(θ)dθ and
using the envelope theorem to see that ∂V∂θ =
∂B
∂θ , consumer surplus can be
rewritten using integration by parts
θZ
θ
V (θ)g(θ)dθ = V (θ) +
θZ
θ
∂B
∂θ
(1−G(θ))dθ (12)
and the Lagrangean that must be maximized is
L = V (θ) +
θZ
θ
∂B
∂θ
(1−G(θ))dθ + (1 + λ)
θZ
θ
(B (w (θ) , θ)− V (θ)−C(w(θ)) g(θ)dθ
+μ
⎛
⎜⎝W −
θZ
θ
w(θ)g(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ (13)
= −λV (θ) +
θZ
θ
(1 + λ) (B (w (θ) , θ)− C(w(θ)) g(θ)− λ∂B
∂θ
(1−G(θ))dθ
+μ
⎛
⎜⎝W −
θZ
θ
w(θ)g(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ (14)
For the case where V (θ) = 0, which is the most relevant, the consumer
with the lowest taste parameter value has no net benefit and the first order
condition for each θ is
∂L
∂w(θ)
= 0 (15)
= (1 + λ)
µ
∂B
∂w
− ∂C
∂w
¶
g(θ)− λ ∂
2B
∂w∂θ
(1−G(θ))− μg(θ) = 0
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Using equation (9), a mark-up condition similar to the one from the
previous model (equation (8)) can be derived:
pm −
³
∂C
∂w +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ξ(w, θ)
(16)
where ξ(w, θ) represents the absolute value of the elasticity in each incre-
mental market (see Appendix A). As expected, the same conclusions as in
the discrete case apply to this model regarding the role of customer het-
erogeneity (here represented by diﬀerent θ) in generating nonlinear prices,
while the scarcity cost does not aﬀect the price schedule shape, but only its
level.
6 Scarcity in demand, cost, and availability
The previous sections have shown that scarcity, represented as a quantity
constraint, has a direct eﬀect that can be seen as an increase in real mar-
ginal cost, so that even when coupled with a budget balancing restriction it
cannot in itself explain a preference for increasing rates. In order to evalu-
ate other eﬀects of scarcity in a more general sense, this section introduces
into the previous models exogenous weather factors, φ, which aﬀect water
availability as well as consumer benefits and supply costs. It is assumed
that a higher value of φ means hotter and drier weather, implying that
∂Bj
∂φ > 0,
∂2Bj
∂wj∂φ
> 0 (water demand increases, for example due to irrigation
or swimming pools), ∂C∂φ > 0,
∂2C
∂w∂φ > 0 (supply costs are higher due to extra
pumping or treatment costs), and dWdφ < 0 (less available water).
Introducing these factors into the models from sections 4 and 5 does not
change the fundamental result for the second-best price schedule, expressed
by the inverse elasticity rule. The first-order conditions for the discrete and
the continuous cases become:
pj −
h
∂C(w∗,φ)
∂w∗ +
μ
1+λ
i
pj
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ξj
³
w∗j , φ
´ (17)
pm −
³
∂C(w∗,φ)
∂w∗ +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ξ(w∗, θ, φ)
(18)
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Nonlinear pricing is still a consequence of consumer heterogeneity and
not of scarcity considerations. However, the shape of the resulting price
schedule may now be aﬀected by the influence of the exogenous weather
factor on the price-elasticities for the diﬀerent consumer types.
6.1 Impact of scarcity on the shape of the price schedule
As noted earlier, the marginal unit price and the mark-up for each con-
sumer type or market increment depend inversely on its price-elasticity of
demand. Nonlinear prices would be increasing if the price-elasticities de-
crease with higher optimal consumption choices and decreasing otherwise.
We can investigate the conditions under which the resulting price schedule is
increasing, constant or decreasing and how they are aﬀected by the weather
parameter. The partial derivatives of the elasticity with respect to the op-
timal level of water consumption are, for the discrete and the continuous
model, respectively:
∂ξj
³
w∗j , φ
´
∂w∗j
= −
∙
∂2Bj(w∗j ,φ)
∂w∗2j
¸2
w∗j −
∂Bj(w∗j ,φ)
∂w∗j
∙
∂3Bj(w∗j ,φ)
∂w∗3j
w∗j +
∂2Bj(w∗j ,φ)
∂w∗2j
¸
∙
∂2Bj(w∗j ,φ)
∂w∗2j
w∗j
¸2
(19)
∂ξ(w∗, θ, φ)
∂w∗
= −
h
∂2B(w∗,θ,φ)
∂w∗2
i2
w∗ − ∂B(w
∗,θ,φ)
∂w∗
h
d3B(w∗,θ,φ)
dw∗3 w
∗ + ∂
2B(w∗,θ,φ)
∂w∗2
i
h
d2B(w∗,θ,φ)
dw∗2 w
∗
i2
(20)
The price schedule will be increasing, constant or decreasing according
to whether
∂ξ
∂w∗
is negative, null or positive. The conditions for each case
are described below (because the result is the same for the discrete and the
continuous models we only present them once in a general form).
In order for elasticity to stay the same regardless of consumption, im-
plying that eﬃcient unit price will be constant, the following condition is
necessary and suﬃcient:
∂ξ(w∗, pm)
∂w∗
= 0⇔
∂B
∂w∗
h
∂3B
∂w∗3w
∗ + ∂
2B
∂w∗2
i
h
∂2B
∂w∗2
i2
w∗
= 1 (21)
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Likewise, for
∂ξ
∂w∗
< 0 the expression on the right-hand side of equation
(21) must be smaller than 1 and for
∂ξ
∂w∗
> 0 it must be greater than 1.
It can be shown that the sign of
∂3B
∂w∗3
, which reflects the curvature of the
demand function, plays a very important role in determining the shape of the
resulting price schedule. In particular,
∂3B
∂w∗3
< 0 is a suﬃcient condition
for IBT to be eﬃcient. Additionally, to verify the impact of the weather
parameter on the price schedule we just have to diﬀerentiate the expression
from (21) in relation to φ. We omit the lenghty resulting expression and
present only suﬃcient conditions for the result to be negative, i.e., for the
influence of the weather variable on the price schedule to reinforce the case
for IBT.
∂3B
∂w∗3
< 0 (22)
∂3B
∂w∗2∂φ
> 0 (23)
∂4B
∂w∗3∂φ
< 0 (24)
Condition (22) means that the demand function would have to be strictly
concave. Condition (23) implies that the demand function’s negative slope
would have to become less steep as temperature and dryness increase. Fi-
nally, condition (24) requires the demand function to become more concave
as temperature and dryness increase. Why do these conditions favour the
adoption of IBT in hotter and drier regions or time periods? They seem to
create a framework where willingness to pay for water consumption increases
more with temperature in high demand consumers than in those with low
demand profiles, decreasing the diﬀerence in marginal valuation of the initial
consumptions and the more extravagant ones. This is consistent with the
fact that low demand residential consumers have a mainly indoor water use
which does not vary much with weather conditions, whereas high demand
residential consumers include those with gardens to sprinkle or swimming
pools to fill in the summer, therefore showing a more variable demand pat-
tern.
High demand residential consumers are also usually associated with
ISCTE - INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE CIÊNCIAS DO TRABALHO E DA EMPRESA,
Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL. Tel. 217938638 Fax.
217940042 E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt Internet: www.dinamia.iscte.pt
Pricing for Scarcity 17
higher income levels (reflected in θ in our model) which means that wa-
ter expenses can weigh very little on their budget. In this context, relative
water demand rigidity between high and low demand users may increase,
with high income and high demand users being more willing and able to
aﬀord the ever more scarce water as temperature increases. In the presence
of a Ramsey pricing policy (with price levels inversely related with price-
elasticities of demand) this would mean that the tariﬀ schedule would tend
towards IBT as temperature increases and a bigger share of the water util-
ity’s revenues would be generated by high demand consumers. This may be
an explanation for the fact that IBT’s are more frequent in countries with
hotter and drier climate, as it is in Europe where we find them mainly in
the Mediterranean countries. Further research in water demand estimation
that explicitly takes into account both climate variables and price structures
could shed some light on whether the conditions presented above actually
hold.
6.2 Impact of scarcity on water consumption
We now evaluate the impacts of scarcity in a two-consumer version of the
simplest model from section 4 (with and without the budget balancing con-
straint). The welfare maximization problem when no budget balancing con-
straint is imposed becomes
...
Max
{w1,w2}
2P
j=1
Bj(wj , φ)− C(w, φ)
s.t.
2P
j=1
wj ≤W (φ)
(25)
As before, marginal benefit must be equal for both consumers, so that the
marginal price must be the same, and the eﬀects of the weather on costs and
on scarcity aren’t consumer-specific, so there is no scarcity related reason to
use increasing marginal prices.
This may no longer be the case when a breakeven constraint is imposed
on the model, resulting the inverse elasticity rule presented in equation (17).
If both the physical and the financial constraints are binding, the first-order
conditions provide a solution for w∗1(φ), w
∗
2(φ) and μ
∗(φ), which can be used
for comparative static analysis of φ. The main results for the case without
the budget balancing constraint can be summarized as follows:
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• the sign for dμ∗dφ is undetermined, but will be positive if we assume
that the marginal benefit of consumption increases more with drier
weather conditions than the marginal cost of water supply (excluding
the opportunity cost of the resource): ∂
2Bj
∂wj∂φ
> ∂
2C
∂w∂φ ,∀j .
• dw
∗
j
dφ is negative for both consumers, as expected, only in the case of
homogeneous consumers. If the marginal benefit functions and the
way they respond to weather conditions ( ∂
2Bj
∂wj∂φ
) diﬀer, then the sign
becomes undetermined, specially for the type whose demand increases
more with the increase in temperature. If the consumer types diﬀer
enough it may become eﬃcient to have one type of consumers (those
whose willingness to pay increases more with temperature increases
and the resulting scarcity) increasing their water consumption during
the drier periods at the cost of the water savings of the one whose
marginal benefits change less. This conclusion can be interpreted in
terms of high vs low demand consumer types as we have done so far
or in terms of diﬀerent customer classes (residential customers, farm-
ers, factories, ...) where some customer class increases consumption
during the summer months (for example, agricultural irrigation). The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for consumer type 1 to increase its
optimal consumption with temperature increases is:
dW
dφ
>
∂2B1
∂w1∂φ
− ∂
2B2
∂w2∂φ
∂2B2
∂w22
(26)
The conclusion is rather diﬀerent for the case with Ramsey pricing. As-
suming heterogeneous types,
dw∗j
dφ is always negative. No consumer class
increases consumption in scarcity times no matter how valuable the water
is to them. This is because, with Ramsey pricing, the greater willingness to
pay from one consumer type will be reflected in a less elastic water demand.
This is taken into account in the water utility optimization problem which
assigns the group’s optimal consumption a higher price (thus balancing the
utility’s budget with second-best eﬃciency). The quantity demanded by the
group falls accordingly, so that in this context the higher valuation of water
in a scarcity situation does not provoke higher consumption, like it did in
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the case without the financial constraint, where the group which valued wa-
ter the most could, in some cases (through the utility’s pricing decisions),
"lead" the other to save water so it can consume more.
7 Dynamic analysis of scarcity
The previous models’ inclusion of weather/scarcity impacts not only on wa-
ter availability, but also on benefit and cost functions, can be carried over
to a dynamic setting that enables us to study the long run eﬀects of climate
change on water resources, namely on the amount of necessary investment
on water supply, treatment and storage infrastructure. We adapt a dy-
namic model by Brock and Dechert (1985) for the public utility pricing
and investment decisions so it is consistent with the characteristics of our
previous static models. We consider, that in the long-run, water scarcity
can be dealt with through the combination of water demand management
(through marginal cost pricing or Ramsey pricing) and investment in water
infrastructure. For example, seasonal water inflow variability can be dealt
with through dam construction to stabilize the amount of available water
supply, thus allowing average yearly water availability to increase. Or alter-
native sources, other than surface water, can be explored, like groundwater
pumping or seawater desalination. The main novelty in the dynamic model
is the introduction of a water availability production function depending
positively on capital invested in water supply infrastructure and negatively
on the weather variable.
Let t denote the time period,Kt the capital invested in water withdrawal,
treatment, storage and distribution infrastructure and Wt be determined by
the water production function:
Wt = f (Kt, φt) (27)
where ∂W∂K > 0, and
∂W
∂φ < 0 as before.
Capital can be built upon by investment in infrastructure, It, and it will
depreciate at rate δ, so that its evolution through time is given by:
K˙ = I − δK
Following Brock and Dechert (1985), we assume the total investment
cost in period t to be given by It + c (It) (price of capital is normalized
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to 1), where c (It) represents installation costs and
∂c(It)
∂It > 0,
∂2c(It)
∂I2t
> 0.
Furthermore, we denote by BL (wt, φt) = B (wt, φt) − C (wt, φt) the social
net benefit from water consumption. The assumptions made in previous
sections about the benefit and cost functions apply.
Assuming the resource constraint is binding, so that all the water made
available through the water supply infrastructure is consumed, and using r
as the appropriate discount rate, the dynamic optimization problem is:
max
∞Z
0
e−rt {BL (f (Kt, φt) , φt)− It − c (It) dt (28)
s.t.
½
K˙ ≡ I − δK
K (0) = K0, K (∞) free
(29)
resulting in the autonomous diﬀerential equation system:
I˙ =
(r + δ)
³
1 + ∂c(I)∂I
´
− ∂BL(K,φ)∂K
∂2c(I)
∂I2
(30)
K˙ = I − δK (31)
whereby the system’s steady-state can be described by:
½
K˙ = 0
I˙ = 0
⇔
(
I = δK
1 + ∂c(I)∂I =
∂BL(K,φ)
∂K
r+δ
(32)
In a steady-state situation, gross investment merely replaces depreciated
capital, and the cost of an additional unit of investment must be equal to the
capitalized value of the marginal benefit. It can be shown that the steady
state is a saddle point. For every level of current capital, only one investment
decision will be located on the stable branches, giving the solution for the
investment variable in every time period. If we start from a lower value for
K than its steady-state value, than investment should be high initially and
it should decrease gradually as we approach the steady-state. If we start
from a level of K above the steady-state value, than the investment should
be lower than the depreciated capital to allow for the amount of capital
invested to decrease. Investment levels should recover as the steady-state is
approached.
ISCTE - INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE CIÊNCIAS DO TRABALHO E DA EMPRESA,
Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL. Tel. 217938638 Fax.
217940042 E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt Internet: www.dinamia.iscte.pt
Pricing for Scarcity 21
It should be noted that, since the φ value to be considered in the long-run
investment decisions should in principle be an average expected value, un-
expected and temporary fluctuations in φ should not change the investment
decisions nor the optimal steady-state level of capital invested. We may
then ask the comparative-static question of what impact will an expected
permanent increase in φ (such as the one that would occur for Mediter-
ranean areas in a global warming context) have. The answer depends on
the sign of ddφ
h
∂BL(f(K,φ),φ)
∂K
i
, i.e., on the impact of increased temperature
and water scarcity on the marginal net benefit of additional units of capi-
tal. The steady-state levels of capital and investment would rise with φ if
d
dφ
h
∂BL(f(K,φ),φ)
∂K
i
is positive. Two conditions are suﬃcient for this to be the
case:
∂2B (w,φ)
∂w∂φ
≥ ∂
2C (w, φ)
∂w∂φ
(33)
∂2f (K,φ)
∂K∂φ
≥ 0 (34)
Condition 33 is similar to the one we found in Section 5 for the scarcity
cost to increase with temperature. This is expected given that in the dy-
namic model, water availability can always be increased through investment.
Condition 34 requires the marginal productivity of capital not to decrease
with water scarcity. If we reverse the signs of the inequalities we have the
necessary, albeit not suﬃcient, conditions for optimal steady-state capital
and investment levels to decrease with temperature.
Further research could combine the techniques of nonlinear pricing with
optimal control to investigate the long-run properties of nonlinear prices. A
description of Ramsey pricing in an isoperimetric problem is presented in
Appendix B.
8 Conclusion
We set out to write this paper because of a puzzling question: if increasing
block tariﬀs for water are not recommended in theoretical economic models,
why are they so popular in practice? Clearly, having one block where water
is charged at a low price (or even a small free allocation) can be justified
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by the need to ensure universal access to such a vital good. Yet the IBT
schemes we found were much more complex than that. Water managers
often mention that increasing rates signal scarcity and as such are a useful
tool in reducing resource use. We find, after a thorough revision of the
literature and an experimentation with diﬀerent models, that a relatively
strong conclusion stands out: the best way to allocate water when scarcity
occurs is to raise its price in accordance with its true marginal cost, which
includes the scarcity cost. Nonlinear pricing is a consequence of consumer
heterogeneity and not of scarcity considerations.
However, the shape of the resulting price schedule may, in specific cir-
cumstances, be aﬀected by the influence of the exogenous weather factor
on the price-elasticities of the demands for the diﬀerent consumer types. If
high demand consumers’ willingness to pay for water rises more with tem-
perature increases relative to low demand consumers than IBT may be more
appropriated in countries with hotter and drier climates. This is consistent
with the fact that mediterranean European countries are often mentioned in
OECD reports to make extensive use of IBT. Other results from our mod-
els are: the impact of weather on the scarcity cost depends on the impact
that weather has on the marginal net benefit of water consumption; it may
be eﬃcient for some consumer types to increase their water consumption
in drier periods when marginal cost pricing is followed, but that is not the
case in the context of a Ramsey pricing policy. The positive association of
the impact of weather on the scarcity cost and on the marginal net bene-
fit of water consumption can be confirmed by introducing dynamic water
availability explicitly into the model.
The temporal variability of supply may originate from a regular and
expected seasonality or from a more uncertain inter-annual irregularity of
water inflows. One possibility for extension of this work is that optimal
coping strategies may be diﬀerent, which can lead us to reconsider the role
of capital investments like dam construction in the stabilization of water
supply and in the prevention of droughts, namely when compared to demand
management tools such as pricing.
There are many other avenues for further research which can now be
followed. One is the combination of dynamic water variability with nonlin-
ear pricing techniques. In order to assess the potential of nonlinear prices
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to promote eﬃciency in the use of water, to reduce overall water demand,
and to recover the costs of water supply, it is also important to consider
real water demand profiles. Further work in this area could be directed at
testing whether the conditions under which IBT is an eﬃcient policy for
drier countries hold. The assertion that IBT are, per se, scarcity signals
with the potential to influence consumer behavior even when price elastic-
ities are very low (as they tend to be for water) could also be tested with
econometric models. Finally, a comparison between the merits of nonlinear
pricing and optimal two-part tariﬀs regarding the eﬃciency coupled with a
budget constraint in a context of scarcity and consumer heterogeneity could
be performed.
9 Appendix A
This Appendix contains the derivation of equation (16). See also (Brown
and Sibley (1986, pp.205-6)).
Proof. (1 + λ)
¡∂B
∂w −
∂C
∂w
¢
g(θ)− λ ∂2B∂w∂θ (1−G(θ))− μg(θ) = 0
since ∂B(w,θ,φ)∂w =
dP
dw ≡ pm
⇔ (1 + λ)
¡
pm − ∂C∂w
¢
g(θ)− μg(θ) = λ ∂2B∂w∂θ (1−G(θ))⇔
⇔
pm −
³
∂C
∂w +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
= λ1+λ
1
pm
∂2B
∂w∂θ
(1−G(θ))
g(θ) ⇔
⇔
pm −
³
∂C
∂w +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
= λ1+λ
1
pm
1
∂θ
∂pm
(1−G(θ))
g(θ) ⇔
where θ indicates the marginal consumer group (θ = θ (Q,P (Q)))
Defining marginal willingness to pay, ρ (w, θ), the self-selection condition
is ρ (w, θ) = pm,so that
dρ
dpm
= 1 ⇔ ∂ρ
∂θ
∂θ
∂pm
= 1 ⇔ ∂θ
∂pm
ρθ = 1 ⇔
∂θ
∂pm
=
1
ρθ
> 0
Since Bwθ ≡
∂2B (w, θ)
∂w∂θ
≡ ρθ ≡
∂ρ (w, θ)
∂θ
,
∂θ
∂pm
=
1
Bθw
Finally,
⇔
pm −
³
∂C
∂w +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
= λ1+λ
1
pm
∂θ
∂pm
g (θ)
(1−G(θ))
⇔
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⇔
pm −
³
∂C
∂w +
μ
1+λ
´
pm
= λ1+λ
1
ξ(w, pm)
which is the condition in the text. ξ(w, pm) emerges through the follow-
ing manipulations:
∂ ln pm (w)
∂pm (w)
=
1
pm (w)
d ln [1−G (θ)]
dpm (w)
=
∂ ln [1−G (θ)]
∂ ln pm (w)
∂ ln pm (w)
∂pm (w)
⇔
⇔ 1
[1−G (θ)]
µ
−g (θ) ∂θ
∂pm
¶
=
∂ ln [1−G (θ)]
∂ ln pm (w)
∗ 1
pm (w)
⇔
⇔ d ln [1−G (θ)]
d ln pm (w)
=
−g (θ) ∂θ
∂pm
pm (w)
[1−G (θ)] ⇔ −
∂ ln [1−G (θ)]
∂ ln pm (w)
=
g (θ)
∂θ
∂pm
pm (w)
[1−G (θ)] ]
[note that in general: ξxf (x) =
∂f (x)
∂x
x
f (x)
=
∂ ln f (x)
∂ lnx
]
10 Appendix B
This Appendix describes the formulation and the solution to the dynamic
water pricing and investment model with a financial constraint. We for-
mulate the problem as an isoperimetric one by adding the following budget
balancing constraint to the problem 28:
∞Z
0
e−rt {D (f (Kt, φt) , φt) f (Kt, φt)− C (f (Kt, φt) , φt)− It − c (It)} dt = 0
(35)
We choose to adopt a global constraint for the time horizon to reflect
a perfect capital market as in Brock and Dechert (1985). The resulting
autonomous diﬀerential equation system is:
I˙ =
(r + δ)
h
1 + ∂c(I)∂I
i
−
h
1 + λ(1+λ)f (K,φ)
i
∂BL(K,φ)
∂K
∂2c(I)
∂I2
(36)
K˙ = I − δK (37)
and the steady-state is characterized by:
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½
K˙ = 0
I˙ = 0
⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
I = δK
1 + ∂c(I)∂I =
k
1+ λ
(1+λ)f(K,φ)
l
∂BL(K,φ)
∂K
(r+δ)
(38)
The steady state equilibrium is a stable node if the following expression
is greater than 1 or a saddle point if it is less than 1:
−∂f(K,φ)∂K
∂BL(K,φ)
∂Kh
1 + λ(1+λ)f (K,φ)
i
∂2BL(K,φ)
∂K2
Comparative statics derivatives are less informative for the isoperimetric
problem, but the sign and magnitude of ddφ
h
∂BL(f(K,φ),φ)
∂K
i
is still an impor-
tant factor in determining whether optimal steady-state leves of capital and
investment should rise or fall in a global warming context.
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